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The objective of this paper is to provide a simple approach endogenizing
the welfare reducing or welfare enhancing effect of informative advertising.
Using this approach, it is possible to analyse the welfare consequences of a
technology shock that reduces unit information costs, and to explain whether
electronic junk mails or portal advertising will cause welfare gains or losses in
a competitive environment.
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1 Introduction
Advertising is often assumed to be a bad that reduces customers’ utility. Machlup
(1980, p. 130) uses colourful words to illustrate this disutility of advertising: “The
existence of such unwanted knowledge will hardly be contested by anybody who has
his radio [. . . ] program rudely interrupted by long-winding commercials [. . . ]. Some
of the jingles which advertise the wonderful qualities of this or that product [. . . ]
may stick with the musical memory of some unhappy listeners like wads of chewing
gum to the shoe soles of unhappy pedestrians and resist all efforts to remove them.”
In recent years, new tedious sources of advertising have been added to those of
television and radio commercials: Contemporaneous to the commercialisation of
the Interet, the amount of unsolicited e-mail, commonly referred to as “spam”, has
proliferated (see Cranor and LaMacchia, 1998). In addition to spam, also portal
advertising has emerged, causing a nuisance to surfers on the internet (see Barros
et al., 2002).
However, advertising may also increase welfare, since it provides information about
sellers, product attributes and prices, allowing beneficial trades to occure. This
social function of advertising was originally mentioned by Kaldor (1950) and later by
Butters (1977), who provided a formal approach to analysing the welfare enhancing
aspect of informative advertising.1
When manufacturers or retailers decide on advertising, they tend to ignore both
external welfare augmenting and reducing effects herein before mentioned. Thus, it
is initially unclear, wether a free market generates the optimal amount of advertising
and maximises possible welfare or not. New approaches have shed some light in this
question by considering media advertising as a two-sided market, namely a market in
which a portal as an intermediary serves customers and firms who want to advertise
their products on that portal.2 Thereby, contributions of Anderson and Coat (2003),
1See Schmalensee (1986) and Kulenkampff (2000, ch. 4, p. 143 et seqq.) for comprehensive
surveys of the literature related to this topic.
2Reisinger (2004) provides a good overview of recent literature on two sided markets, especially
on portal competition.
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Barros et al. (2002) and Reisinger (2004) focus on the competition between portals
and advertising firms, but omit the informational aspect of advertising with regard to
its effect on consumer surplus. Gal-Or and Dukes (2003) and Dukes (2004) consider
this aspect in their research.
The contribution of this article is to provide a comprehensive view of (media) ad-
vertising that integrates the above-mentioned aspects into a welfare analysis that is
applicable to comparative statics.
Therefore, the article has two main aims. First, it provides a simple framework
which includes both externalities specified above and thus is able to endogenise the
overall welfare reducing or welfare enhancing result of informative advertising. It is
then possible to analyse the welfare effect of a technology shock that reduces unit
information costs, and to explain whether electronic junk mails or portal advertising
will cause welfare gains or losses in a competitive environment.
2 The model
Consider a market as described by Butters (1977), where a large population of
producers and consumers trade a homogeneous good. All sellers use an identical
technology for producing the good at constant marginal costs c. All consumers have
the same reservation price pm for the traded good, and each consumer buys one unit
of the traded good, unless the price does not exceed pm. However, customers are
initially uninformed and do not know where to buy the products. In order to inform
buyers, sellers send out advertisements at random. Each advertisement reaches a
single buyer and is regarded as a binding offer to sell the product at price p. If a
customer receives more than one advertisement, he will accept the cheapest offer as
long as this price offer does not exceed the reservation price pm, while customers
who have not received any advertising will not be able to buy the product. If a
consumer receives two or more offers quoting the same price, he chooses one of them
randomly.
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Let wH be the cost of sending one advertisement to one consumer, selected acci-
dentally and independently, and let wL be the customer’s cost of “reading”
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advertisement. While the expedient of an advertisement (i. e. the producer or, in
the extended model, the internet portal) bears wH , the reading cost wL is borne by
the recipient of the ad, i. e. the customer. Hence, total social costs of advertising
add up to w = wH + wL per advertisement.
The pricing decision of a firm depends on the advertising cost it has to bear and the
probability of a sale generated at the announced price p. Note that this probability
is influenced by the number of other advertisements quoting a price lower than p
a customer is expected to receive. Assume that this number can be characterised
by an advertising price distribution function Z(p), showing the expected number
of ads per customer sent out at a price less than or equal to p. Note that Z(p) is
approximately continuous, with a large population of sellers and consumers. As a
matter of fact, there will be no advertising at prices p > pm, as such a price would
exceed the customers’ willingness to pay. Hence, the total amount of advertising
per consumer is given by Z(pm).
Advertising is successful whenever the consumer reading an ad has received no other
advertising offering the product at a lower price. For a given Z(p), the probability
of success pi(p) can approximately be calculated using the Poisson distribution (see
Butters, 1977, p. 468):
pi(p) = e−Z(p) (1)
Note that, due to random delivery of ads, there will always remain some uninformed
customers who are therefore not in position to buy the good. However, this propor-
tion of uninformed customers declines when Z(p) grows large.
Given the assumptions stated above, it is now possible to investigate the market
outcome for three different scenarios:
(i) In section three, I consider a market model where reading costs do not exist or are
negligibly small. Thus, firms bear the total social cost of advertising, when sending
3Readers should not take this expression too literally: It involves any costs borne by the reader
of the ad, e. g. costs to identify and discard the message.
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advertisements randomly to potential customers. This model may be applied to
describe (approximately) the traditional direct mailing that is characterised by a
high unit cost wH of enveloping and mailing the advertisement letter, while the cost
wL of opening and reading that letter is comparatively low and may be neglected.
This is the case investigated by Butters (1977). It will serve as reference for the
other scenarios, because its outcome is efficient.
(ii) In section four, I consider the case of spam mailing. I presume that reading costs
do exist and make up an important part of the total social costs of advertising. They
are borne by the consumers who receive the advertisements. It is then possible to
eveluate the welfare loss arising from the external effect of sending advertisements.
I will show that a reduction of the unit information cost wH—as happened with the
advent of electronic mailing—will lead to an increasing welfare loss, if the reading
cost wL does not change.
(iii) In section five, I extend the model to the case of portal advertising. I assume that
producers do not engage in direct (electronic) mailing, but place their advertising
on the website of an internet portal and pay a price per view wI to the portal
operator. All internet portals are assumed to provide the same editorial content and
to bear the same unit cost wH to provide the advertisement, that is, to transmit
the advertisement information to the viewer. However, it is assumed that this
unit information cost wH has declined (close) to zero due to the new advertising
technology. Note that there are virtually no costs incurred by an internet portal,
when the advertisement information is transferred to its visitors.
It is then possible to compare the (in-)efficiency of spam mailing with the outcome
of portal advertising. I will state that portal advertising is a more efficient way to
provide customers with advertising information. However, there is still too much
advertising on portals.
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3 Base case: direct mailing
Consider first the case where the firms bear total advertising costs w = wH + wL.
Butters (1977) argues that firms will engage in additional price offers p as long as
they can expect positive profits from additional advertising. In a free-entry compet-
itive equilibrium, this implies zero expected profit G(p) for any advertisements sent
out and announcing a price p between c− w and pm:
G(p) = pi(p)(p− c)− w = 0 (2)




Note that both equations (3) and (1) have to be fulfilled. Hence, the equilibrium
advertising price distribution is as follows:
Z(p) =

ln(pm − c)− lnw iff p ≥ pm
ln(p− c)− lnw iff c+ w ≤ p < pm
0 iff p < c+ w
(4)
In equilibrium, all prices between c + w and pm will be advertised. However, the
probability of success pi(p) declines from 1 (for a price offer p = c+w) to w/(pm− c)
for p = pm. To calculate the net surplus per consumer, W , one has to regard the
gains from trade pm − c, which occur with probability 1 − pi(pm), and the total
information costs w · Z(pm):
W = pm − c− w − w ln(pm − c) + w lnw (5)
It is easy to see that the market equilibrium maximises W : Assume that an ad-
ditional advertisement is sent. This will be welfare increasing if an uninformed
customer is reached—which happens with probability pi(pm) = w/(p − c). Hence,
expected gains of an additional advertisement are (p − c)[w/(p − c)] and equal its
social unit cost in w.
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4 The (in-)efficiency of spam mailing
I do now consider the case where reading costs exist. Assume that every consumer
has to bear a unit reading cost wL when he receives an advertisement, no matter
whether he will accept this price offer or not. However, sellers ignore this reading
cost when they decide on their advertising strategy. As a consequence, they send
too many ads: The lower bound of the advertising price distribution lies at c+wH ,
whereas a lower bound of c + w = c + wH + wL would be socially efficient. Hence,
the total amount of advertising Z∗(pm) = ln(pm − c) − lnwH exceeds the efficient
value Zˆ(pm) = ln(pm − c)− ln(wH +wL). Thus, the equilibrium surplus is given by
W ∗ = pm − c− wH − (wH + wL) ln[(pm − c)/wH ] (6)
From (5) we can derive the welfare maximum by replacing w with wL + wH :
Wˆ = pm − c− wH − wL − (wH + wL) ln[(pm − c)/(wH + wL)] (7)
The welfare loss due to the reading cost externality is given by ∆W = Wˆ −W ∗:
∆W = (wH + wL) ln[(wH + wL)/wH ]− wL (8)
Note that this welfare loss can be approximated by a simple Taylor expansion:4 5
0 ≤ ∆W ≤ w2L/wH (9)
Whereas the welfare loss from excessive advertising does not depend on the potential
gains from trade, the relation between the unit information cost wH and the unit
reading cost wL is crucial.
6 As soon as the reading costs account for a larger portion
of total advertising costs, this leads to an increase of the welfare loss. On this
account, the welfare loss by “spam” advertising has risen after new information
4From standard textbook mathematics, it follows that ln[(x+ y)/y] ≤ x/y and ln[(x+ y)/y] ≥
x/(x+ y) generally holds for any x, y > 0
5I use the Taylor approximation here because the resulting formula is more “eye catching”.
However, the main results of this section will remain unchanged, regardless whether the Taylor
approximation is used or not.
6This proposition is affirmed by the derivatives of ∆W with respect to wH and wL: The results
are ∂∆W/∂wL = ln(wH + wL) > 0 and ∂∆W/∂wH = ln[(wH + wL)/wH ]− wL/wH < 0.
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technology had been introduced: While the cost of “reading” an advertisement has
roughly stayed the same, unit information cost has declined dramatically with the
emergence of electronic mailing. Nowadays, spammers who send electronc bulk mail
bear less than 5% of the social costs of advertising.7 As a consequence, electronic
bulk mailing has increased dramatically. As Lueg (2003) emphasizes, an average
customer received some 1400 electronic junk mail messages (“spam”) in the year
2003. In total, spam is estimated to cause damages of some 3 billion EUR p. a. in
Europe and 8 billion EUR in the U. S. The policy implication is to ban electronic
junk mailing since there exists a more efficient way of informing the customers about
products. This will be shown in the next section.
5 The (in-)efficiency of portal advertising
Consider now the third scenario: Advertisements are not sent from producers, but
are placed on internet portals. Internet users—that is the customers—are assumed
to choose one portal each, to read its advertising and to benefit from editorial
content. There may be a benefit from the advertising information, if reading the ad
leads to a purchase. As in the case of direct advertising, I assume that the advertising
information is transmitted to the customers by incidence. This will be the case when
we assume that visitors surfing a portal (e. g., Yahoo), read different pages and ads
that are installed on these pages, and they do not know which advertisement is
placed on which site, before reading the sites. In their portal choice, consumers
behave perfectly rationally: They regard the disutility of reading the ads as well as
the expected surplus from a potential purchase.
7Cranor and La Macchina (1998, p. 75 et seq.) stress that “[s]ome bulk email services will send
100,000 email messages for under $ 200, and do-it yourselfers can buy a million email addresses
for under $ 100”. In contrast, reading or deleating as many junk massages is adherent to an
opportunity cost of roughly estimated 4000 USD. Bandwidth and processing costs are incurred
even when spam filtering programs are used (see Weinstein, 2003).
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5.1 Model assumptions
To be more specific, I assume a three stage model for portal advertising: In the first
stage, internet portals I set their ad-rates wI . The ad-rate indicates the price the
advertiser has to pay each time a consumer visits the page containing the recpective
advertisement.8 In the second stage, the firms decide on their advertising strategy,
that is, they decide on where to place the ad and what prices to announce. In the
last stage, consumers choose one portal, each.
To keep calculations simple, I assume perfect competition between two internet
portals.9 That is, they provide the same editorial content r (e. g. news, stories
and hyperlinks), and the expected consumer surplus depends on both, the pleasure
of reading the editorial content v(r) and the customer’s net expected benefit of
advertising qI :
UI = qI(wI , wL, pm − c) + v(r) (10)
While v(r) is fixed in the context of this model10, the portals implicitly decide on
qI when they set the advertisement prices wI . One should note that this additional
information rent qI a consumer receives by visiting a portal and reading the ads,
is similar to what I have called the “net surplus per consumer” in the basic model
described in the preceding sections. While in the basic case, the net consumer
surplus is equivalent to total welfare (because firms just earn zero profits), gains
from trade are now shared by customers and internet portals. To calculate the
correct value of qI , one has to bear in mind that the producers are charged wI for
portal advertisements, and not the actual unit information cost wH . They internalise
this ad-rate wI when calculating a price offer. As a consequence, qI yields
qI = pm − c− wI − (wI + wL) ln[(pm − c)/wI ] (11)
The profit of an internet portal depends on its market share (i. e. the number of
customers x(qI) visiting that portal), the amount of advertising per consumer which
8In reality, this is the most common buying model—however, the ad-rate is expressed by the
“CPM”, i. e. the cost of 1000 ad impressions.
9This is the most simple way to model perfect competition between internet portals.
10Still, it might be interesting to look at the portals’ decision on r in an extended version of the
model.
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is given by the advertising distribution function Z(pm) = ln[(pm − c)/wI ] (please
notice the analogy to the basic model), and the mark up on the unit information
cost of advertising wI − wH . As I have mentioned in section two, I will assume
that unit information costs wH are negligible (i. e., close to zero) compared to the
unit reading cost wL, due to technology issues—however, in order to receive more
general insights, I will consider wH in the calculations. In addition, the fixed cost
r for providing editorial content might be taken into consideration. However, r will
be ignored within the further analysis, since it is assumed to be a sunk cost. Hence,
the profit of an internet portal I can be written as
GI = xI(qI)(wI − wH) ln[(pm − c)/wI ] (12)
With this information on the consumers’ and the internet portals’ payoff functions,
I am now in the position to calculate the subgame perfect equilibrium of the market
outcome.
5.2 The market equilibrium
The market equilibrium is solved by backward induction. In the last step, customers
decide on which portal to visit. Since both portals offer the same editorial content,
they select the internet portal that offers a higher expected information rent qI
to their visitors. If both portals offer the same qI , customers select one portal at
random. Note that qI depends on the amount of advertising, represented by the
advertising price distribution, on the respective internet portal: If there was no
advertising on that portal, a visitor could not gain from any additional trade. On
the other hand, an internet portal full of advertising would be tedious to read, with
reading costs that might well exceed the expected gains from trade.
Hence, the sellers’ advertising policies, which is the second stage decision, seems to
be crucial for the success of an internet portal. However, the average number of ads
that a consumer will find on his preferred portal, is a result of the advertisement
price wI a portal charges to the producers. Since producers do not possess any
market power, they just adapt their advertising policy to the market conditions,
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that is the portals’ advertising prices. Please note that not all producers turn
away from a portal that charges a higher unit ad-rate wI , because an advertisement
succeeds with a higher probability, there, due to a smaller amount of advertising
(and less advertising of the competitors) on that portal. To conclude, the second
stage advertising decision of the producers is predetermined by the the first stage
decision of the internet portals on ad-rates wI .
In general, players aim to maximize their own objective funtion. Take a look at
the objective function of an internet portal (see equation 12): Its value depends
on the number of visitors and the mark up on the unit information cost. It is
important to know that the number of visitors is not a continous function. As
explained in the discussion of the last step, consumers select the portal that offers the
highest expected net utility. Hence, the portal operators engage in a Bertrand-like
competition for customers. As a result, they adopt the objective of the consumers
in order to maximize the customers expected net utility qI . Note that both portals
will set the same ad-rate because they maximize the same objective function (the
one of the consumers).
Doing this, they face two constraints: Firstly, the ad-rate wI has to cover the unit
information cost wH (otherwise it would cause losses for the internet portals offering
advertising; I will call this the “zero profit constraint”). Secondly, advertising has to
generate a positive surplus for visitors reading the ads. Else, the customers would
select a portal that does not provide any advertising, and a portal may attract all
customers by providing only little or no advertising (this I will call the “consumer
participation constraint”). If this condition is not fulfilled, there always exists a
Nash equilibrium in which both portals do not provide any advertisements.11
Taking this into consideration, we receive the following maximization problem:
max
wI
qI = pm − c− wI − (wI + wL) ln[(pm − c)/wI ] (13)
s. t. w∗I ≥ wH
q∗I ≥ 0
11However, this may not be the unique equilibrium, as will be stated below.
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Now, consider the unrestricted solution w∗I to this maximization problem. It is given
implicitly by the first order condition
wL
w∗I
− ln pM − c
w∗I
= 0. (14)
Unfortunately, it is not possible to present an explicit solution for w∗I . However,
equation (14) can be simplified by expressing pm − c as a multiple k of the reading
cost wL, i. e. k is defined as (pm − c)/wL. In other words, I treat the unit reading
cost wL as a numeraire. This procedure is reasonable, because the reading cost
is unlikely to be affected from technology change. It is then possible to implicitly





= ln k (15)
As can be seen easily, the equilibrium value wI is only influenced by the potential
gross gains from trade in terms of reading cost kwL, and the reading cost wL.
Obviously, the minimum value of the left hand side of this equation is 1. This value
is received for wL = wH , i. e. when the equilibrium ad-rate equals the reading cost.
As a consequence, for any spread pm − c ≤ ewL, no interior solution exists and zero
advertising maximizes qI . For the border case pm− c = ewL, a solution exists where
the internet portals charge an ad-rate wI equal to the reading cost wL. For higher
values of k, there are two relations wL/wI solving the first order condition. However,
the second order condition holds only for the case that the reading cost exceeds the
ad-rate, that is w∗I < wL. The other solution for the first order condition w
∗
I > wL
marks the minimum value of the objective function.
Until now, the two constraints w∗I ≥ wH and q∗I ≥ 0 have been neglegted. Take a
look at the consumer participation constraint, first: Intuitively, this constraint is
violated when the gross potential benefit from reading an ad is small in comparison
to the reading cost wL.
12 Indeed, reading will be profitable if potential gains from
trade are large compared to the reading costs. As mentioned above, this relative
12For example, consider the case where pm − c = wL: Even if the product was offered at a low
price close to c, the customer would harm from reading one ad, and his utility will be reduced
further, when he has to read more than one advertisement.
11
benefit is denoted by k. Now, define k¯ such that qi(k¯) = 0. Using equation (11) and




















This equation system can be solved numerically.13 As result, k¯ = 3, 35, that is,
the potential gains from trade have to be three times higher than the reading cost
of an advertisement in order to generate a positive surplus of advertising. At this
value of k, the portals charge an ad-rate w∗I = 0, 56wL. At first sight, it seems
astonishing that gains from trade have to significantly exceed reading costs of an
ad. However, notice that it cannot be assured that every consumer receives exactly
one ad; actually, due to the distribution of ads at random, several portal visitors
will suffer from reading more than one advertisement, while others do not receive
any advertising information.
Assume that the consumer participation constraint is violated. The consequences
should be mentioned in passing. Note that the interior solution w∗I/wL indicates an
interior solution (that is a local maximum) to the customer’s maximization prob-
lem. Hence, a marginal deviation from this ad-rate will not lead to an increase of
the consumer’s net expected utility, and a portal is not able to attract additional
consumers by changing its ad-rate marginally. However, if q∗I < 0, there will exist a
w∗∗I > w
∗




I < 0, that is, a portal that deviates in a discrete way
from strategy w∗I will attract all customers of the economy. The discrete increase
of the ad-rate will also lead to a significant decline of advertisement on this portal.
Hence, the portal’s profit does not increase necessarily by deviation, although the
number of its visitors reduplicates.14
13Notice that two equations are sufficient to solve the system, since k¯ depends on the relative
ad-rate wI/wL, and not on the absolute values wH and wL.
14It depends on k, whether deviation is profitable: For k > 3, 06, the deviation strategy is not
attractive for a portal operator, because advertising has to be constricted too much in order to
raise the customers net expected utility beyond q∗I . Hence, two pure strategy equilibria exist: The
well-established, in which both portals set wI = w∗I , and a second one, in which both portals
12
Note that the second constraint, namely the zero profit constraint, is not binding:
As internet portals use electronic communication technology to distribute the adver-
tisement, unit information cost wH is (close to) zero and negligible compared to the
reading cost of an advertisement, i. e. wH << wL. As a consequence, portals will
earn positive (per consumer) profits (wI − wH) ln[(pm − c)/wI ] from the advertise-
ments they distribute, as long as wI is strictly positive. Since both portals offer the
same ad-rates, they share the market for advertising and for portal visiting equally.
5.3 Welfare analysis
In order to calculate the net benefit from portal advertising WI , consider the total
amount of portal advertising Z∗I (pm) = ln(pm − c) − lnwI which determines the
probability of trade to occur, and the unit cost of advertisement, w = wH + wL.
Hence, the equilibrium net benefit from portal advertising can be written as:
W ∗I = pm − c− wI − (wH + wL) ln[(pm − c)/wI ] (18)
In order to obtain the welfare loss of portal advertising ∆WI = Wˆ − WI , the
equilibrium value is compared to the efficient solution (see equation 7):
∆WI = (wH + wL) ln(wH + wL)− (wH + wL) lnwI − (wH + wL) + wI (19)
In a further step, wH + wL is replaced by (w − wI) + wI . It is then straightforward
to estimate the welfare loss by a Taylor-approximation similar to equation (8):
0 ≤ ∆WI ≤ (w − wI)2/wI (20)
In the last section, I have pointed out that wH is close to zero and the reading cost
wL is accountable for the bulk of total unit advertisement cost. Keeping this in
mind, it is straightforward argumentation that the welfare loss is reduced by portal
advertising—to see this, replace w by wL and compare the Taylor-approximation
(20) with equation (8).15
provide no advertising, that is, wI = kwL. If k < 3, 06, only the latter exists. Notice that the
value of k has been found numerically.
15A higher welfare loss due to portal advertising (compared to direct mailing) can be ruled out
even for a positive unit information cost wH : As can be seen by direct inspection, ∆WI < ∆W iff
13
A formal proof results by comparing the exact values of total welfare (18) to (6).
From (18)− (6) yields the efficiency gain ∆WIE, that is realised by the switch from




= wH − wI − w lnwH + w lnwI (21)
After transforming this expression, one receives:
∆WIE = w ln[wI/wH ]− w[(wI − wH)/(wI + wH)] (22)
Now denote wD = wI − wH > 0 the always positive difference between the ad-
rate and the unit information cost. Then for the logarithm term of equation (22)
holds: ln(wI/wH) ≥ wD/(wD − wH). Further it applies that: wD/(wD − wH) >
wD/(wD − 2wH) and wD/(wD − 2wH) = (wI − wH)/(wI + wH). Thus ∆WIE > 0.
5.4 Stylized results
I am now in the position to summarize the results of the portal model and compare
them to the results received for spam mailing:
(i) When setting the ad-rate, internet portals consider the reading costs of their
visitors and so internalise them partialy. Thus portals set an ad-rate wI higher
than the zero unit information cost wH and earn positive profits. Note that this
result can only be applied to advertising intermediaries that use modern information
technology. Else, wH may well be high enough to be a lower bound for wI (otherwise
the zero profit constraint would be violated).
(ii) Although reading costs are partially internalised by the portals, the market
equilibrium is not efficient, since we observe too much advertising: As has been
shown, wI < wL. Thus advertising is still too cheap, because the ad-rate is lower
than the social cost of an advertisement. Why do portals not internalise the complete
wI > wH . wI < wH would hurt the zero profit constraint of the information intermediaries. Note
that it makes no difference, whether to use the approximated or the exact values.
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reading costs of their customers, although they aim to maximize their objective
function? Note that there is no market interaction between the portals and their
visitors, that is, the portal operators are not able to pay the customers for visiting
their homepage. Actually, when setting their ad-rate wI , they decide implicitely on
both, the total welfare (i. e. the net gains from trade) and the distribution of that
gains among the customers and themselves. And a higher ad-rate wI means that
the portals receive a larger part of the welfare gains, while customers lose due to
higher product prices. To avoid this, the portals reduce the ad rate wI beneath the
welfare maximizing value wL.
(iii) Still, the outcome is more efficient than in the case of spam mailing, because
spammers do not internalise reading costs at all. In case of spam mailing, the welfare
loss of reading costs may exceed the potential gains from trade. Internet portals,
instead, will only engage in advertising when positive welfare effects are guaranteed.
6 Concluding remarks
I have shown that electronic junk mailing is a rather inefficient way to communicate
product information to the customers, while portal advertising provides a more
efficient alternative. Given the unique result I have received for “spam”-mailing,
the lesson for public authorities should be clear: Junk mailing should be banned,
as long as it is not possible to introduce a tax on spam advertising—a tax like this
should cover the reading cost of some 3c per unit16 advertisement.
Authorities may also think about introducing a (lower!) tax on portal advertising.
Yet, market power will also prevent internet portals from charging too low ad-rates:
Notice that the portals will charge higher rates for their advertisements in case of
market power in order to keep a larger part of trade surplus. However, a strong
monopoly may even charge ad-rates that exceed social costs. As a consequence,
advertising activity may be inefficiently low. Whether market power of internet
16This crude estimation is based on the assumtion that it takes 10 seconds time to read an
advertisement and that the opportunity cost of an average reader is roughly 10 EUR per hour.
15
portals works as an antidot to excessive advertising, should be an interesting topic
for further research.
References
Anderson, S. and S. Coate (2003), Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare
Analysis, Verginia Economics Online Papers, No. 358, University of Virginia.
Barros, P., Kind, H., Nilssen, T. and L. Sørgard (2002), Media Competition when
the Audience Dislikes Advertising: A Theory of Vertical Alliances on the In-
ternet, Working Paper No. 79/02, Institute for Research in Economics and
Business Administration, Bergen.
Butters, G. (1977), Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices, Re-
view of Economic Studies, Vol. 44, pp. 465 – 491.
Cranor, L. and B. LaMacchia (1998), Spam!, Communications of the ACM, Vol.
41 (8), pp. 74 – 83.
Dukes, A. (2004), The Advertising Market in a Product Oligopoly, Journal of In-
dustrial Economics, Vol. 52, pp. 327 – 348, September 2004
Gal-Or, E. and A. Dukes (2003), Minimum Differentiation in Commercial Media
Markets, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 12, pp. 291 –
325.
Kaldor, N. (1950), The Economic Aspects of Advertising, Review of Economic Stud-
ies, Vol. 18, pp. 1 – 27.
Kulenkampff, G. (2000), Zur Effizienz von Informationsma¨rkten, Schriften zur Rund-
funko¨konomie, Vol. 5, Vistas Verlag GmbH, Berlin.
Lueg, C. (2003), “Sie haben schon wieder Post”: Spam als Forschungsgebiet der
Wirtschaftsinformatik, in: Uhr, W., Esswein, W. and E. Schoop (Eds.), Wirt-
schaftsinformatik 2003, Vol. 2, pp. 41 – 59. Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg.
Machlup, F. (1980), Knowledge: Its creation, distribution, and economic signifi-
cance, Vol. 1: Knowledge and Knowledge production, Princeton, New Jersey.
16
Reisinger, M. (2004), Two-Sided Markets with Negative Externalities, Working Pa-
per, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t Mu¨nchen.
Schmalensee, R. (1986), Advertising and Market Structure, in: Stiglitz, J. and
G. Matheweson (Eds.), New Developments in the Analysis of Market Struc-
ture, Part 7, pp. 373 – 396. The Macmillan Press Ltd., Houndmills et al.
Weinstein, L. (2003), SpamWars, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 46 (8), p. 136.
17
